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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RYE PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2029, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-610 
CITY OF RYE, 
Employer. 
DUNCAN MACRAE, for Petitioner 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Employer 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rye Professional Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 2029, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its unit placement petition, which sought to place the title of 
Fire Lieutenant/Inspector in its unit of fire fighters employed by the City of Rye (City). 
The ALJ determined that the Fire Lieutenant/Inspector is a high level supervisor and as 
such it was inappropriate to place the title into a unit of employees supervised by the 
Fire Lieutenant/Inspector. 
The Association argues in its exceptions to the ALJ's decision that there is a 
discrepancy between the ALJ's findings as to the duties the Fire Lieutenant/Inspector 
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performs and the record. Consequently, the Association asserts, the ALJ erred in his 
factual and legal analysis. The City has not responded to the exceptions.1 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the Association's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
A full exposition of the facts is recited in the ALJ's decision; thus, we will confine 
ourselves to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions raised by the Association. 
In September 1985, the City of Rye created the title of Fire Lieutenant/Inspector. 
James W. Dianni was appointed provisionally to the position. On February 24, 1986, 
Dianni's appointment became permanent. At that time, neither party sought to declare 
the position as management or to place the position within the existing bargaining unit. 
In fact, the title of Fire Inspector had been removed from the Association's bargaining 
unit prior to Mr. Dianni's appointment in 1985. Subsequent collective bargaining 
agreements did not include the title of Fire Lieutenant/Inspector in the Association's 
recognition clause. 
1The City filed its brief in response to the Association's exceptions on June 26, 
2000. Our Rules of Procedure, §213.3, provide that a response may be filed within 
seven working days of receipt of the exceptions. The Association's exceptions were 
filed on May 12, 2000. Even allowing for mail, the City's response is not timely filed and 
it has not, therefore, been considered. 
On July 10, 2000, the Association filed a reply to the City's response to the 
exceptions. Section 213.3 of the Rules also provides that no pleading other than 
exceptions, cross-exceptions or a response thereto will be accepted or considered by 
the Board unless it is requested or authorized by the Board. As we neither requested 
nor authorized the Association's reply, it, too, has not been considered. 
Board - CP-610 -3 
The City's fire department consists of both volunteer and paid fire fighters. The 
Chief is an unpaid volunteer. The paid staff consists of fifteen fire fighters and the Fire 
Lieutenant/Inspector. In his capacity as Fire Lieutenant/Inspector, Dianni's basic 
function is to supervise the paid staff. 
On JuneJO, 1999, the Association filed this unit placement petition.^The 
Association sought to include the Fire Lieutenant/Inspector title in the bargaining unit of 
fifteen paid fire fighters. The Association alleged that the duties of the Fire 
Lieutenant/Inspector position had evolved so as to have a community of interest with 
the fire fighters. In addition, the Association alleged that the Fire Lieutenant/Inspector 
has no managerial or confidential duties or authority affecting the mission of the City's 
Fire Department. 
The City's response to the petition generally denied these allegations. 
DISCUSSION 
The Association argues in its exceptions, inter alia, that the policy of the Act 
favors placement of fire officers in bargaining units of rank-and-file fire fighters. 
We have said that in cases involving employees of police or fire departments, 
both the officers and the rank-and-file members share the same mission: to prevent or 
control and extinguish fires.2 This, however, is usually where any similarity ends. 
2See Greenville Fire Dist, 6 PERB H4041 (1973). 
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A unit placement petition seeks to add an unrepresented position to an existing 
unit pursuant to the criteria established in §207 of the Act. It is within this proceeding 
that the appropriateness of the unit is examined. 
While §§207.1 (a) and (c) of the Act require that both the community of interest 
and the employer-s convenience be eonsidered4n determining unit-appropriateness, we 
have given the community of interest criteria the most importance of the criteria set forth 
in §207.3 Since the position of Fire Lieutenant/Inspector has been unrepresented, we 
need only concern ourselves with whether this position shares a community of interest 
with the rank-and-file fire fighters. But, in the case of previously unrepresented 
supervisory employees, it is community/conflict of interest and the employer's 
administrative convenience standard which determine the appropriate uniting.4 
When examining community of interest in cases involving uniformed supervisors 
and rank-and-file employees, we look to, among other things, whether there exists a 
real or potential conflict of interest.5 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Fire Lieutenant/Inspector does 
not have sufficient supervisory authority to justify excluding the position from the 
existing rank-and-file unit of fire fighters. This argument would be relevant if the petition 
3Board of Educ. of the CitySch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 14 PERB fl3051 
(1981). 
4County of Genesee, 29 PERB fl3068 (1996); Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist, 
21 PERB P060 (1988). 
5New York State Div. of State Police, 1 PERB 1J399.32 (1968). 
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before us were one to determine the managerial status of the Fire Lieutenant/Inspector 
position. It carries little weight, however, when the issue is the placement of the 
position into an existing unit of rank-and-file fire fighters.6 
What is material is whether the supervisory functions may indicate a conflict of 
interest—In this regard^we have looked at responsibility forthe imposition of-discipline, 
evaluation of subordinates, training, work assignments, and other related personnel 
issues.8 
Based on the record before us, it appears that Dianni, in his position of Fire 
Lieutenant/Inspector, is responsible for evaluating the fire fighters' performance, is the 
first step in the grievance procedure, and has authority to institute disciplinary 
proceedings against a fire fighter under his supervision. He is responsible for work 
assignments, overtime and supervises the day-to-day operations of the paid staff. 
These duties indicate sufficient command responsibilities to make it inappropriate to 
place him in the same unit as those who are subject to his authority.9 
Consequently, since the City has objected to the inclusion of the Fire 
Lieutenant/Inspector position in the Association's unit, we are constrained by precedent 
against the inclusion of a supervisor in a unit with rank-and-file employees over the 
objection of a party in interest, if the degree and nature of the supervisory 
eHartsdale Fire Dist., 10 PERB1J3032 (1977). 
7See supra, note 3 at 3156. 
8See supra, note 2 at 4072. 
9Town of Carmel, 31 PERB 1f3047 (1998). 
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responsibilities indicate a conflict of interest.10 The Association's exceptions are, 
therefore, dismissed in their entirety. 
We accordingly affirm the decision of the ALJ that the title Fire 
Lieutenant/Inspector is not appropriately included in the petitioner's unit. 
^-. IT-IS, THEREEORE^ORDEREDJhat the petition be, and it herebyJs, dismissed. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
liA^C^UJU^^i 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/Jc hn T. Mitchell, Member 
^Clinton Community College, 31 PERB 1J3070, at 3155 (1998); see also East 
Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist, 11 PERB 1J3075 (1978); City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
Binghamton, 10 PERB 1J3062 (1977); New York State Div. of State Police, supra. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAMMONDSPORT NON-TEACHING 
PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-628 
HAMMONDSPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Petitioner 
) MURRY F. SOLOMON, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Hammondsport Central School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting a unit 
placement petition filed by the Hammondsport Non-Teaching Personnel Organization 
(Organization) seeking to add the positions of teacher aide, typist/account clerk and 
nurse to its bargaining unit of noninstructional employees of the District. The ALJ 
determined that because the positions sought to be added were not in excess of thirty 
percent of the existing unit, that the unit placement petition was appropriate and that no 
election was required. The positions were, therefore, placed in the Organization's 
\ bargaining unit. 
Board - CP-628 -2 
The District argues that the ALJ should have dismissed the petition because the 
number of positions added to the unit are in excess of thirty percent of the existing unit. 
The Organization has responded that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be 
affirmed.1 
Based upon our reviewof the record and-consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The parties submitted the matter for decision on the basis of the pleadings, 
correspondence between the parties and the ALJ, and their legal briefs. 
The Organization petitioned to add three unrepresented titles - nurse, teacher 
aide and typist/account clerk - to the existing bargaining unit.2 The positions, at the 
time of the petition, were held by ten employees. At the time the ALJ issued her 
1The Organization filed a document entitled "cross-exceptions". The Organization 
does not take any exceptions to the ALJ's decision but in fact is responding to the 
District's exceptions. 
2The existingunit is defined in the parties' collective bargaining agreement as 
follows: 
...all regularly employed bus drivers, bus mechanics, 
maintenance personnel (building maintenance mechanics, 
groundskeepers), cafeteria personnel, cleaners, and 
substitute personnel who are appointed for or who work for 
ninety (90) consecutive days or more....Excluded from the 
bargaining unit are seasonal and temporary workers, 
substitute personnel who are appointed for or who work less 
than ninety (90) consecutive days, retired workers, 
secretaries, teaching personnel in the teachers' bargaining 
unit, teaching assistants, teacher aides, supervisory 
personnel, management personnel and all other 
personnel.... 
Board - CP-628 -3 
decision, there were nine persons holding the petitioned-for positions.3 The 
Organization claimed that the existing unit at the time the petition was filed was 
comprised of thirty-six employees. That count included three substitute employees who 
the Organization claimed were members of the bargaining unit because they were long-
term substitutes.iThe-number-also included one employee, JoyJvlartinez, who is^a_part-
time bus driver for the District and, therefore, included in the bargaining unit, and who is 
also a part-time teacher aide, a position sought to be added to the unit. 
The District claimed that there were ten employees in the positions covered by 
the petition because Joy Martinez must be counted even though she is already a 
member of the bargaining unit by virtue of her employment as a part-time bus driver. 
The District, pointing to the recognition clause in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, also argued that there were only thirty-one employees in the existing 
bargaining unit because neither Slayton nor Button could be counted as Slayton had 
not worked ninety consecutive days for the District and Button had resigned and his 
position remained unfilled. 
3One employee, Jan Harrington, had resigned from her position as typist/account 
clerk effective November 23,1999. Although it appears that that position has been 
filled, the incumbent had not yet worked ninety consecutive days and was not included. 
4Gerald Slayton, a substitute cleaner, has worked for the District for four years 
and has received a letter of reasonable assurance of continued employment which 
would disqualify him from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to New York State 
Labor Law, §590. Winston Button was a part-time substitute cleaner for the District until 
his resignation on December 21, 1999. 
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The ALJ counted Martinez as a member of the existing unit but did not count her 
as one of the petitioned-for individuals. The ALJ further concluded that Slayton was a 
member of the bargaining unit because, although he had not worked ninety consecutive 
days in any of the four years of his employment with the District, he had been regularly 
employed asa substitute cleaner for four years.5. : 
DISCUSSION 
The District argues that Martinez must be included in the number of the 
individuals in titles sought to be added to the bargaining unit and that Slayton may not 
be considered to be in the bargaining unit because he is excluded by virtue of the 
language in the recognition clause. If Martinez is included and Slayton is excluded, the 
District argues that the petitioned-for employees comprise more than thirty percent of 
the existing unit and the unit placement petition must be dismissed. 
In Ogdensburg City School District (hereafter Ogdensburg),6 we addressed the 
issues involved when a unit placement petition sought to add such a number of 
positions to an existing unit that the bargaining agent's majority status might be called 
into question. 
Our unit placement rules are intended to permit relatively minor 
adjustments to the composition of an existing negotiating unit. That intent 
5The ALJ also decided that certain employees of the District who had previously 
retired but were employed by the District as part-time bus drivers, were included in the 
bargaining unit by virtue of a memorandum of understanding between the District and 
the Organization. No exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the ALJ's decision. 
We, therefore, do not reach it. 
631 PERB H3060, at 3131-32 (1998). 
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was manifest when the rule applied only to newly created or substantially 
altered positions. Although the rule has been amended to open the unit 
placement process to "a position," without qualification by type, the intent 
was only to allow for the placement into the appropriate unit of 
established, unchanged positions which had been excluded historically 
from representation. The rule change was not intended to make a unit 
placement petition a substitute for a certification/decertification 
proceeding, which is the only appropriate mechanism for the resolution of 
questions concerning a union's majority^support-When majority^status 
questions are presented, the policies of the Act mandate that the 
representation questions be channeled for decision under a petition for 
certification/decertification. Only the rules applicable to the filing and 
processing of a petition for certification/decertification, which incorporate 
fixed filing periods and showing of interest requirements, protect the 
multiple interests at stake when a question as to an incumbent union's 
continuing majority status is raised. 
Although our unit placement rules cannot be used when the 
number of positions sought to be added to a unit is large enough to put 
the incumbent union's majority status reasonably in dispute, we do not 
have any decisions at any level as to when a majority status question is 
raised for purposes of a unit placement petition, (footnote omitted) For 
purposes of a unit placement petition, we hold that a majority status 
question is presented if the number of employees proposed to be added 
to a unit is thirty percent or more of the number of employees in the 
existing unit. This number's comparison gives, we believe, the fairest 
indication as to whether an incumbent union's majority status has been 
placed in issue and the one which is best suited to the limited purposes of 
a unit placement petition. 
The focus of our inquiry is whether a sufficient number of employees are being 
added to an existing bargaining unit so as to call into question the bargaining agent's 
majority status. Here, Martinez is already a member of the bargaining unit as a part-
time bus driver. The addition of the teacher aide title, which she also holds, does not 
add an additional employee to the existing bargaining unit. Martinez may hold two titles 
in the District, but she is only one employee. We, therefore, find that the ALJ correctly 
counted Martinez as being part of the existing unit but not as an additional employee to 
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be added to the bargaining unit by virtue of the Organization's petition. As a result, as 
the ALJ found, the Organization is seeking to add only nine employees to the existing 
unit. 
However, we do not agree with the ALJ's conclusion with respect to Slayton. 
Slayton has-been-employed by the DistriGt for four-years as a substitute-cleaner. He 
received a letter of reasonable assurance for the 1999-2000 school year and continues 
to be employed by the District as a substitute cleaner. However, this record does not 
establish that Slayton has ever been employed by the District for ninety consecutive 
days. The recognition clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement clearly 
includes only those substitutes "who are appointed for or who work ninety (90) 
consecutive days or more." 
While Slayton may be considered to be a public employee of the District by virtue 
of his regularity of employment7 and his receipt of the letter of reasonable assurance of 
continued employment for the 1999-2000 school year,8 he is not a member of the 
bargaining unit. He is specifically excluded by the language of the recognition clause.9 
The ALJ, therefore, erred by including Slayton in the Organization's bargaining unit for 
purposes of computing the number of employees in the unit. 
7
 See Village ofDryden, 22'PERB 1J3035 (1989). 
8See Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, §201.7(d). 
9See Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB1J3007 (2000). 
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However, even with the exclusion of Slayton, the bargaining unit is made up of 
thirty-two employees. As nine employees is less than thirty percent of the existing 
bargaining unit, the ALJ correctly granted the Organization's petition for unit placement 
and placed the titles of teacher aide, nurse and typist/account clerk in the bargaining 
unit represented byihe Organization 
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ's decision is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in 
part, and the petition of the Organization is granted.10 SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
10lnasmuch as the addition of the nurse, teacher aide and typist/account clerk to 
the Organization's unit does not bring into question its continuing majority status, no 
election is ordered. See New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 27 PERB fl3034 
(1994). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20569 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO 
Respondent. 
GENTILE, BROTMAN, & BENJAMIN (SUSAN BROTMAN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
CHARLES D. MAURER, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Ronald Grassel to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge. Grassel had 
charged that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT), and the 
New York State United Teachers (NYSUT)1, had violated §§209-a.2 (a) and (c) of the 
1On July 6,1999, NYSUT moved that the charge against it be dismissed. The 
ALJ granted the motion because NYSUT is not the bargaining agent. See Greece Cent: 
Sch. Dist (Lanzillo), 28 PERB fl3048 (1995), cont'd, 29 PERB 1(7003 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County 1996). Grassel sought a review of the ALJ's decision but we denied his motion 
as an interlocutory appeal. United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2, and New York State 
United Teachers, 32 PERB fl3071 (1999). No exceptions to the ALJ's final decision 
have been taken with respect to the dismissal of the charge against NYSUT. We, 
therefore, do not reach it. 
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Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when NYSUT terminated its legal 
representation of Grassel in a proceeding pursuant to §3020-a of the New York State 
Education Law brought against Grassel by his employer, the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District).2 
Grassel filed an offer of proof setting forth the facts he would prove at a hearing 
to sustain the improper practice charge against UFT and to respond to UFT's motion to 
dismiss the charge. UFT's motion was granted by the ALJ, who found that the 
allegations against UFT made by Grassel in his improper practice charge were 
unsupported by the offer of proof and that Grassel had failed to show that UFT's 
actions were arbitrary, discriminatory or taken in bad faith. 
Grassel excepts to the ALJ's decision arguing that the ALJ had the obligation in 
deciding the motion to dismiss to accept as true all of the allegations made by Grassel 
in the offer of proof and to dismiss the improper practice charge only if all the 
reasonable inferences therefrom are legally insufficient to sustain the charge. The 
response filed by UFT supports the ALJ's decision. 
2The District was named as a party by virtue of §209-a.3 of the Act, which makes 
the public employer a statutory party to any improper practice charge which alleges that 
the bargaining agent has breached its duty of fair representation by failing to process, 
or by its manner of processing, a grievance brought pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement between it and the public employer. On June 24,1999, the 
District moved that it be removed from the charge because the conduct of the 
bargaining agent in-issue did not involve a contractual grievance. The conferencing ALJ 
granted the District's motion. No exceptions have been taken to that determination and, 
therefore, we do not reach it. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
In December 1997, Grassel received a notice of termination from the District 
pursuant to §3020-a. He sought representation at the §3020-a hearing from UFT. 
Pursuant to an agreement between UFT and NYSUT, Grassel was notified in late 
December 1997, that counsel from NYSUT, Mitchell Rubenstein, would represent him 
in the §3020-a proceeding. Grassel was represented by Rubenstein through 1998, until 
September 10, 1998, when the NYSUT General Counsel advised Grassel by letter that, 
because of his failure to cooperate in the preparation of his case, NYSUT was 
withdrawing as counsel. 
Grassel alleged in his offer of proof that NYSUT's decision to withdraw was 
motivated by Rubenstein's disapproval of a prior claim brought by Grassel against 
NYSUT. Grassel alleges that Rubenstein made remarks to that effect to him in January 
1998, and Grassel's offer of proof alleges a connection between the alleged remarks in 
January 1998 and NYSUT's decision to withdraw as his counsel in September 1998. 
NYSUT alleges, and Grassel concurs, that from January 1998 through June 
1998, Grassel and Rubenstein were in frequent contact, exchanged letters, telephone 
calls, and had several meetings. As a result of their last meeting on June 29,1998, 
Grassel was to provide Rubenstein with certain information by July 1, 1998.3 
3Grassel alleges that he had already provided all the information in his 
possession to Rubenstein. 
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Rubenstein received no information from Grassel, which prompted him to send an 
August 7, 1998 letter to Grassel outlining the progress of the case preparation up to 
that point and reiterating the need for the information requested, as the first day of the 
§3020-a hearing was scheduled for September 14, 1998. Receiving no response to the 
August 7Uetter, Rubenstein wroteJoLGrassel on .AugustJ 3, Au5uM25, Ser^tembeL2, 
and September 8, 1998, requesting that Grassel contact him and advising him, in the 
last two letters, that his failure to timely contact NYSUT would result in Rubenstein 
recommending that NYSUT withdraw as counsel because of lack of cooperation. 
Finally, as Grassel had not contacted Rubenstein by September 10, 1998, as specified 
in the September 8,1998 letter, on September 11, 1998, the NYSUT General Counsel 
wrote to Grassel informing him that NYSUT was withdrawing as his counsel. All but the 
first letter from NYSUT to Grassel were sent certified mail and the last letter was also 
sent by Express Mail. Grassel faxed a letter to Rubenstein on September 11, 1998, 
offering no explanation for his failure to respond to the August and September letters 
and criticizing Rubenstein's representation. 
In his offer of proof, Grassel alleges that he was on vacation during the four 
weeks prior to the September 14 hearing date and that he so advised the §3020-a 
hearing panel of that fact in a September 14, 1998 letter to them asking that the panel 
refuse to accept Rubenstein's withdrawal as counsel.4 
4Rubenstein was not copied on the letter. 
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DISCUSSION 
In order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of 
fair representation against a union, there must be a showing 
that the activity, or lack thereof, which formed the basis of 
the charges against the union was deliberately invidious, 
arbitrary or founded in bad faith.5 
We-have^held, in deciding a motion to dismiss, that an ALJ is to assume the truth 
of all of the charging party's evidence and to give the charging party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.6 Grassel mistakenly 
argues that the ALJ should have accepted as true all the allegations in his offer of 
proof. By evidence, we mean facts and not allegations. The facts may be ascertained 
by the ALJ from an offer of proof or evidence adduced at a hearing or both.7 
The facts in this case establish that UFT properly represented Grassel. The 
withdrawal of UFT as Grassel's counsel days before the scheduled §3020-a hearing 
was a result of Grassel's failure to respond to several letters from his counsel, 
Rubenstein, who was attempting to prepare for the §3020-a hearing. Grassel points out 
in his offer that he was on vacation during the weeks preceding his hearing date and 
that he responded as soon as he returned from vacation. However, Grassel's response 
to Rubenstein's letters, three days before the hearing, offered Rubenstein no 
explanation for his failure to respond to the letters, provided none of the information that 
5C/V/7 Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 
H7024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 
(1988). 
6See State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Servs.), 29 PERB fl3015 (1996); 
County of Nassau (Police Dep't), M PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
7See United Fed'n of Teachers (Ayazi), 32 PERB P069 (1999). 
Board - U-20569 -6 
Rubenstein had requested or even indicated that Grassel was prepared to assist 
NYSUT in his defense if Rubenstein remained as counsel. His letter instead 
complained about Rubenstein's representation. 
Rubenstein withdrew as Grassel's counsel after trying to contact him for over six 
weeks with no response from Grassel. It was not unreasonable in those circumstances 
for Rubenstein to assume that Grassel was unwilling to cooperate in his own defense. 
As Rubenstein's response to Grassel's failure to respond to his numerous inquiries was 
not unreasonable, it cannot be said to be discriminatory or arbitrary.8 As to Grassel's 
allegation that Rubenstein's decision was improperly motivated, there is nothing in 
Grassel's offer of proof to support such an allegation. Even assuming, as Grassel 
alleges, that Rubenstein was critical of Grassel when they first met in January 1998 
because Grassel had previously filed charges against NYSUT, the record shows that 
Rubenstein undertook to represent Grassel and that Grassel had no complaints about 
his representation until after Rubenstein withdrew as counsel. 
The offer of proof submitted by Grassel simply does not allege sufficient facts to 
support a finding of a breach of the duty of fair representation.9 As the ALJ found, the 
case presented here is simply one of a union attorney who, having received no 
response, despite repeated requests, from an employee with an imminently scheduled 
§3020-a hearing, determines that the employee is no longer participating in his own 
8There is no evidence that any other bargaining unit member in a similar 
situation has been treated differently by UFT or NYSUT. 
9See United Univ. Professions, Inc. (Garvin), 21 PERB 1J3052 (1988). 
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defense. On the facts of this case, as presented by Grassel, it cannot be said that 
UFT's decision was arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith. 
Based on the foregoing, Grassel's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ is affirmed. 
lXJS,J"i-IEREEQRE, ORDEREDLthatJhe^chargeumust be, and It hexebyjs, j 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UTICA PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20924 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO (PATRICK J. CREMO of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (MARY M. ROACH of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of Utica (City) to an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision which found a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when the City imposed 
disciplinary charges against Anthony Zumpano, the then President of the Utica 
Professional Fire Fighters Association, Local 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association). 
The City excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the conduct Zumpano 
engaged in was not protected under the Act. He was disciplined for his insubordinate 
behavior in the Mayor's office and, therefore, the ALJ's determination that Zumpano 
would not have been disciplined "but for" his protected activity was incorrect. The 
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Association has filed a response to the exceptions, arguing, inter alia, that Zumpano's 
conduct was protected under the Act. 
FACTS 
We will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions filed by 
theXity,^ : 
On or about April 23, 1999, Arbitrator Jeffrey M. Selchick mailed to the City and 
the Association the majority opinion and award of the interest arbitration panel in 
accordance with §209.4 of the Act.1 Aside from the salary award, the panel deleted the 
minimum manning provision contained in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
On April 22, 1999, counsel for the Association, who was aware of the forthcoming 
award, had attempted to withdraw from the arbitration process. 
By letter to the Mayor dated April 28, 1999, Zumpano objected to the City's action 
in the form of a directive issued by the Fire Department which informed the Association 
that the City intended to cease compliance with the minimum manning provision in the 
collective bargaining contract. Zumpano arrived at the Mayor's office at about 4:30 in 
the afternoon of April 28, 2000, intending to personally deliver his letter to the Mayor. 
However, upon his arrival, he observed that the Mayor was on the telephone. While in 
the Mayor's office, Zumpano was confronted by Cornell Maye, the City's Public Safety 
Commissioner, who was also waiting for the Mayor. 
1The award was for the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1998. 
collective bargaining agreement expired in 1992. 
The parties' last 
Board - U-20924 -3 
Maye asked Zumpano why he was in the Mayor's office. Zumpano explained to 
Maye that he was off duty and that he intended to personally serve the Mayor with his 
letter. At that point, Maye directed Zumpano to give him the letter and said he would 
deliver it to the Mayor. This fact is clearly established in Zumpano's testimony on cross-
examination^ 
Q. Excuse me. He did tell you he was giving you a directive? 
A. Yes, he did.2 
Redirect Examination 
Q. On your cross-examination you said you understood that Cornell Maye 
gave a directive to give him the letter that you were holding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And upon understanding that you were receiving a directive, what did you 
say to Mr. Maye? 
A. I told him that I was acting in my capacity as President of Local 32 and that 
I wasn't taking orders from him because I wasn't on duty and I was acting 
in that capacity. I didn't feel a directive at that point from him giving mean 
order to hand me this or do this or do that I thought was out of line.3 
2-Transcript p. 45. 
3Transcript pp. 50-51. 
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The events that followed the Commissioner's directive are the subject of much 
conflicting testimony as to the heightened emotional level of the discourse between 
Zumpano and Maye. 
On April 29, 1999, Zumpano was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to 
§75 of^the Civil Service Law^accusing him of-conduct unbecoming an officer, misconduct 
and insubordination, and seeking the penalty of a three-day suspension without pay.4 
DISCUSSION 
In City of Salamanca,5 we outlined the respective burdens in cases involving 
allegedly improperly motivated actions: 
In order to establish such improper motivation, a charging party 
must prove that he had been engaged in protected activities, and 
that the respondent had knowledge of and acted because of those 
activities. [Footnote omitted] If the charging party proves a prima 
facie case of improper motivation, the burden of persuasion shifts to 
the respondent to establish that its actions were motivated by 
legitimate business reasons. [Footnote omitted] 
The Association meets the first two prongs of the test because Zumpano was 
acting in his capacity as the Association's President at the time of the confrontation with 
Maye and Maye was aware of his union status and the purpose of his presence at the 
4Hearings in the instant case took place on November 17,1999, December 28, 
1999 and December 29, 1999. On December 27, 1999, the parties stipulated to 
withdraw the Association's demand for grievance arbitration, to restore one-half (thirty-
six hours) of pay resulting from a three-day suspension and to rely upon the ALJ's 
determination as to whether §§209-a.1(a) and (c) had been violated and as to whether 
the remaining thirty-six hours of the suspension would be restored. 
518 PERB H3012, at 3027 (1985). 
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Mayor's office. However, there is in the record no evidence of any improper motivation 
on Maye's part with respect to the §75 disciplinary charges filed against Zumpano. 
The ALJ relies upon our decision in Village of Scotia6 to support his 
determination. We disagree. 
\n Seotiaywe determined that-the-police officer-s letter-to the^Town Board^which 
was highly critical of the Police Chief, was protected speech under the Act. However, 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the officer's protected speech were vastly 
different from the instant case. Here, it is not Zumpano's protected speech, in the form 
of his letter, that is in issue. It is his conduct, which the ALJ failed to address. 
We said in Scotia that "[w]e are also cognizant of the need to consider the context 
and the recipients of the words and the message conveyed to them in determining 
whether statements are protected by the Act."7 The Appellate Division, in confirming our 
determination, illustrated this principle with an analogous principle found in the National 
Labor Relations Act: 
Whether conduct transcends the bounds of protected activity greatly 
depends upon the context in which it occurs, [citation omitted] Thus, 
offensive conduct may not lose its protected status if it occurred 
during a closed meeting, but may not be protected if it took place in 
public in defiance of the employer's authority . 8 
629 PERB 1J3071 (1996), cont'd in pertinent part, 241 AD2d 29, 31 PERB 1J7008 
(3dDep't1998). 
7Note5, supra, at 3170. 
aSupra, note 6, at 7013-14. 
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We have consistently in the past balanced the fundamental right of an employee 
to participate in the activities of the employee organization of his choosing with the 
employer's right to maintain order and respect.9 "On occasion, a [union] representative 
may engage in impulsive behavior that an employer would not have to tolerate from an 
employee who is engaged-inhis normal tasks.-Although an employer may not ordinarily 
discipline the employee representative for such behavior, there are circumstances in 
which overzealous behavior on his part may constitute misconduct."10 Consequently, 
inappropriate conduct, even for part of a union activity which is protected, will not shield 
an employee from justifiable discipline.11 
It is axiomatic that the organizational structure of the fire department, a quasi-
military organization, would be irreparably harmed and its orderly operation substantially 
impaired if, during the day-to-day performance of duties, the order of a superior officer 
can simply be disobeyed whenever a subordinate concludes that it is unreasonable.12 
The Association argues in its memorandum of law that "[t]he City offered no 
explanation for disciplining Zumpano for his activities in delivering the letter, beyond his 
9State of New York (Ben Aaman), 11 PERB 1J3084 (1978). 
10/d., at 3137. See also NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F2d 584 (7th Cir. 
1965). 
11
 Nelson v. City of Buffalo Fire Dep't, 254 AD2d 761 (4th Dep't 1998); New York 
City Transit Auth. (Toussaint), 25 PERB ^3076 (1992); Island Trees Public Schools, 14 
PERB U3020 (1981); See also Earle Industries v. NLRB, 75 F3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996). 
^Rivera v. Beekman, 86 AD2d 1 (1st Dep't 1982). 
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failure (while off-duty and acting on behalf of the union) to obey Commissioner Maye's 
order to hand the letter to him."13 
Upon our review of the record, we find that this argument ignores the excerpt of 
the City's Rules and Regulations of the Bureau of Fire14 which states at Section 93: "AH 
lawSrordinanGes^rules^regulations andorders will-be cheerfullyLand promptlyLobeyed 
by all members." The parties' collective bargaining agreement incorporates, by 
reference, at Article V, the contents of the Rules.15 
The Association offers no explanation for Zumpano's insubordinate conduct other 
than he was off duty and was not required to obey orders. In fact, as Zumpano walked 
out of the Mayor's office, he chose to deliver the letter to a young man whom he did not 
know rather than hand it to Maye.1(? We reject this justification defense.17 Zumpano's 
appropriate recourse was to comply with Maye's order and seek redress through 
available legal channels.18 By refusing a direct order and engaging in loud and 
opprobrious conduct, Zumpano removed himself from the Act's protection. 
We further dismiss the charge because the record is devoid of any evidence that 
the City's action in disciplining Zumpano was improperly motivated. The Association's 
^Association's memorandum of law, p. 12. 
14City Exhibit 4. 
15ALJ Exhibit 1 and Joint Exhibit 5. 
16Transcript p. 46. 
17See Nelson v. City of Buffalo Fire Dep't, supra, note 11. 
18See Farmingdale Union Free Sch. Dist, 11 PERB 113055 (1978). 
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only evidence of anti-union animus is the parties' contentious labor history. We note, 
however, that proof of a contentious labor history is not conclusive evidence that all acts 
taken within the context of that relationship are always, or even necessarily, improperly 
motivated.19 
Based upon the record-before us and our consideration of-the-parties-arguments, 
we reverse the determination of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Jorln T. Mitchell, Member 
19See Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB 1J3079 (1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DAVID ROEMER, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NQ^U-21634 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
) , • . 
DAVID ROEMER, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by David Roemer to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his 
improper practice charge, which alleged that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed 
to properly represent him in a disciplinary grievance, failed to reimburse him for 
attorney's fees when he retained private counsel and failed to compensate him for 
damages he had suffered because of UFTs failure to properly represent him.1 
1Roemer's employer, the Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York (District), is made a statutory party to the charge pursuant to §209-a.3 
of the Act, as the charge alleges that UFT failed to properly process his grievances. 
See United Fed'n of Teachers, 33 PERB 1J3004 (2000). 
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FACTS 
Roemer's charge was filed on April 13, 2000. The charge alleges that Roemer, a 
science teacher, was subjected to unsatisfactory evaluations in 1994 and 1995 due to a 
difference of opinion with his supervisors about teaching methodology. On November 3, 
1994^UFT filed a request for conciliation, pursuant to-Article 24 of the UFT-District 
collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, Roemer filed a grievance alleging that he 
was still being subjected to unsatisfactory evaluations and that the teaching 
methodology issue had not yet been resolved through the conciliation process. Initially, 
UFT represented Roemer at Step 1 and Step 2 of the grievance procedure, but 
declined to further represent him at Step 3. In February 1996, at Roemer's request, 
UFT reconsidered its position and remanded Roemer's grievance on the evaluations to 
the contractual conciliation process. 
Roemer further alleged in his charge that the District removed him from the 
classroom in May 1996 and served him with disciplinary charges in November 1996. 
UFT represented Roemer in the disciplinary grievance until Roemer retained private 
counsel, who represented him at the disciplinary grievance hearing. Sometime in 1997 
or 1998, Roemer was found innocent of the charge of incompetence but guilty of 
insubordination for failing to heed his supervisors' instructions as to teaching 
methodology. Roemer sent letters to UFT in 1998 and 1999, complaining about UFT's 
representation of him and seeking attorney's fees. On January 9, 2000, Roemer's 
request for reimbursement for legal expenses was denied by UFT. Apparently, Roemer 
also pursued his claims to the New York Court of Appeals. 
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Roemer was advised that his improper practice charge was deficient in that 
almost all of the allegations were untimely and, as to his allegation that UFT had 
refused to reimburse him for his legal expenses, he had not pled any facts which, if 
proven, would establish that UFT acted in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or in 
bad faith^Roemerwas given until May 10, 2000, to correctthedeficienciesiin his 
charge, amend it, withdraw it or object to the deficiency determination. 
Roemer responded with two letters, objecting to the deficiency determination and 
attempting to further explain his charge. The Director dismissed his charge by decision 
dated May 1, 2000, finding that the charge was largely untimely and, as to the one 
timely allegation, that no facts had been pled which would establish the violation 
alleged. On May 4, 2000, Roemer filed an amendment to the charge alleging that UFT, 
in the January 9, 2000 letter sent to him, contrived to cover up its improper practices. 
Roemer alleges in his exceptions that the Director erred by characterizing his 
two letters as objections to the determination that his charge was deficient and not as 
clarifications, by finding that Roemer had pled no facts to support his allegations and by 
issuing his decision before he had received Roemer's May 4 amendment. Neither UFT 
nor the District has responded. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of Roemer's arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the Director. 
DISCUSSION 
The Director's timeliness determination was correct. Section 204.1(a)(1) of our 
Rules of Procedure requires that a charge be filed within four months of the alleged 
violative act. All but one of the acts complained of by Roemer in his charge occurred 
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between 1994 and 1999. With the exception of UFT's letter of January 9, 2000, all of 
the allegations related to incidents which occurred well beyond the time for filing an 
improper practice charge. We have also previously determined that the filing period is 
not tolled while ancillary proceedings are being pursued by or on behalf of a charging 
pa-rty-i-even when those proceedings-have the-potentialto effectively-moottheimproper 
practice alleged.2 Roemer's charge, filed years after the actions alleged to violate the 
Act is, therefore, untimely.3 
As to Roemer's sole timely allegation, that on January 9, 2000, UFT refused to 
reimburse him for his private attorney's fees, Roemer pled no facts that would support a 
finding that UFT had provided that benefit to other unit members or that its refusal to 
reimburse Roemer was arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith.4 Therefore, the 
allegation was also properly dismissed by the Director.5 
2See Orange County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 28 PERB1J3081 
(1995). 
3See Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Hokai), 32 PERB P019 (1999). 
4See New York City Transit Auth. and TWU, Local 100 (Clark), 32 PERB P031 
(1999). 
5Roemer alleges that the Director improperly failed to consider the facts set forth 
in his May 4, 2000 amendment to the charge. He argues that the deficiency letter he 
received gave him until May 10, 2000 to clarify, amend or withdraw his charge or object 
to the deficiency determination. The Director, having received two letters from Roemer 
objecting to the deficiency determination and no indication from him that more 
documentation was forthcoming, did not wait until May 10 but dismissed the charge by 
decision dated May 1, 2000. Roemer alleges in his exceptions that he had not yet 
received the Director's decision on May 4, 2000, when he filed his amendment. That 
the Director issued his decision without consideration of the May 4, 2000 amendment 
does not warrant a contrary conclusion in this matter because there were no new facts 
pled in the amendment. 
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Based on the foregoing, Roemer's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
»k. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN THOMAS MCANDREW, 
Charging Party^ 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-21286 
PORT JERVIS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN THOMAS MCANDREW, pro se 
CUDDEBACK & ONOFRY (ROBERT A. ONOFRY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by John Thomas McAndrew to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his improper practice charge, which alleged that the Port Jervis City School 
District (District) violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when its Superintendent of Schools and its attorney made certain 
oral and written statements to him. 
At the hearing in this matter, the Director asked McAndrew for an offer of proof 
as to the evidence McAndrew would proffer in support of his charge. Based upon 
McAndrew's offer, the Director closed the hearing and accepted post-hearing briefs 
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from both parties. The Director thereafter dismissed the charge, finding that McAndrew 
had offered no proof that the District was improperly motivated in its actions. 
McAndrew excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that the District's acts 
discriminate against him and that the Director erred in dismissing his charge. The 
District has not-responded to McAndrew^s exceptions - — 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of McAndrew's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
It is well established that in order to prove a violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of 
the Act, a charging party must demonstrate that he or she has been engaged in 
protected activity, that the respondent has knowledge of the protected activity and 
acted because of that activity.1 McAndrew has filed several improper practice charges 
and grievances and otherwise availed himself of the protections of the Act, all with the 
knowledge of the District and its agents.2 
^City of Salamanca, 18 PERB U3012 (1985). See also Town of Ramapo, 32 
PERB 1J3077 (1999); City of Rye, 28 PERB 113067 (1995); Town of Independence, 23 
PERB H3020 (1990). 
2See Port Jervis City Sch. Dist, 32 PERB H4545 (1999); Port Jervis Teachers 
Ass'n and Port Jervis City Sch. Dist, 28 PERB H4673 (1995); Port Jervis City Sch. 
Dist, 24 PERB 1J3031 (1991), where McAndrew's charges were sustained. See also 
PortJervis City Sch. Dist, 33 PERB U3027 (2000); PortJervis Teachers Ass'n, 22 
PERB H3021, cont'd, 22 PERB 1J7021 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1989); PortJervis City 
Sch. Dist, 22 PERB H3022 (1989); PortJervis Teachers Ass'n, 19 PERB H3038 (1986); 
PortJervis Teachers Ass'n, 18 PERB 1J3044 (1988); PortJervis City Sch. Dist, 18 
PERB H4561 (1988); PortJervis City Sch. Dist, 18 PERB H4560 (1988), where 
McAndrew's improper practice charges against the District and/or the Port Jervis 
Teachers Association were dismissed. 
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At least partially as a result of his activism, McAndrew and the District share a 
contentious labor history. As we noted in an earlier case involving McAndrew and the 
District: 
Although the parties' labor relations history, including 
evidence of an employer's animus, is properly considered as 
a factor in determining whether an action was improperly 
motivated, such evidence is merely one factor among 
several that must be considered. Proof of a contentious 
labor history is not conclusive evidence that all actions taken 
within the context of that relationship are always, or even 
necessarily, improperly motivated.3 
Beyond McAndrew's allegations, there is no evidence in the record of improper 
motivation on the part of the District which would support the finding of a violation. The 
written and oral statements made to McAndrew by the Superintendent and the District 
attorney were not in and of themselves improper and, given the context in which they 
were made - during discussions pertaining to the settlement of improper practice 
charges and other actions taken by McAndrew against the District - there is simply no 
coercion or threat of retaliation. The statements reflect the District's position with 
respect to the terms of the settlement of all matters pertaining to McAndrew and the 
District's ongoing relationship with McAndrew. That the District was seeking 
concessions or imposing conditions upon the settlement proposed by McAndrew 
evidences no impropriety. 
; 
zPort Jervis City Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1(3027, at 3073 (2000), citing Town of 
Henrietta, 28 PERB 1J3079 (1995); see also Erie County Water Auth., 27 PERB 1J3010 
(1995). 
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Based on the foregoing, McAndrew's exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Mi 
: A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KEVIN C. KULESA, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19225 
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
) 
Intervenor. 
NORMAN P. DEEP, ESQ., for Charging Party 
HITE & CASEY, P.C. (MARIA B. MORRIS of counsel), for Respondent 
ROBERT CALLI, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
determination dismissing an improper practice charge filed by Kevin C. Kulesa alleging, 
as amended, that the Oneida County Deputy Sheriffs Benevolent Association 
(Association) violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
) Act (Act) by withdrawing its demand for arbitration of Kulesa's grievance on the grounds 
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that such withdrawal was a breach of the Association's bylaws regarding arbitration of 
grievances and that the decision to withdraw the grievance was based on Kulesa's 
heart condition. 
The County of Oneida (County) appeared as a party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the 
ActJ^lt filed no response^to the charge and offered no proof at the hearing 
FACTS2 
A hearing took place on April 21, 1998, at which time Kulesa presented his direct 
case. At the conclusion of his direct case, the Association moved to dismiss the 
improper practice charge. The ALJ dismissed so much of the charge that alleged the 
Association violated its bylaws by withdrawing Kulesa's grievance from arbitration. 
Subsequently, hearings on the remaining issue3 took place on December 16, 
1998, and July 8, 1999, at which time the Association presented evidence in support of 
its defense and Kulesa presented rebuttal evidence. The hearings closed on July 8, 
1999, and the parties submitted briefs. 
1Section 209-a.3 makes the public employer a statutory party to certain charges 
filed under §209-a.2 (c). 
2We will confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the 
issues. A detailed description of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
3The allegation that Kulesa's heart condition was the reason the Association 
withdrew his grievance from arbitration. 
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DISCUSSION 
A. Bylaws Violation: 
The ALJ disposed of this issue on the Association's motion to dismiss. There 
appears only to be a disagreement between the Association and one of its members. 
Since this is an4ntemaUdisagreement, it is outside ofLourijurisdiction^We adoptthe 
ALJ's findings and conclusions and affirm. Kulesa's exceptions (a) through (g) and (j) 
are, therefore, denied. 
B. Withdrawal of Grievance Based on Heart Condition: 
We have consistently held that the duty of fair representation is breached only by 
conduct which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.4 In the judicial forum, in order 
"to sustain a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation there must be 
substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct, or evidence of 
discrimination that is intentional, severe and unrelated to legitimate union objectives."5 
We, as well as the courts, have held that allegations that a union has been 
careless, inept, ineffective or negligent in the investigation and presentation of a 
grievance do not evidence a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.6 
4See CSEA, Local 1000 (Heffelfinger), 32 PERB 1J3044 (1999) and case cited 
therein. 
5Mellon v. Benker, 186 AD2d 1020, 25 PERB 1J7534, at 7578 (4lh Dep't 1992). 
6See CSEA, Local 1000 (Heffelfinger), supra note 4. See also text 
accompanying note 5. 
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We have also found consensus with the courts whenever the charge involves the 
internal affairs of a union, such as a violation of its bylaws or constitution. We have 
held that "the deprivation of membership rights and privileges of union members are 
internal union affairs which lie outside our jurisdiction."7 
In light of-theforegoing^it is axiomatic that a union has-discretion-with respect to 
processing grievances and the mere failure on the part of the union to process a 
grievance is not a violation of its duty of fair representation.8 
Kulesa argues in his exceptions (h) and (i) that there was sufficient testimony to 
demonstrate his health problems were common knowledge and, therefore, it was 
reasonable to infer that false information about Kulesa's health given by Liddy to the 
Association's Executive Board influenced the Board to withdraw the grievance from 
arbitration. 
Kulesa fails, however, to specifically cite the testimony to which these exceptions 
refer. Our Rules of Procedure9 require that the issues to be reviewed be set forth 
specifically and designate by page citation the portions of the record relied upon. 
Upon our review of the record, there does not exist any evidence of bad faith in 
the Association's decision to withdraw Kulesa's grievance. Based upon the foregoing, 
we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the improper practice charge and deny Kulesa's 
exceptions in their entirety. 
7See Westchester County Dep't of Correction Superior Officers' Ass'n, Inc., 26 
PERB H3077, at 3149 (1993); Cove NeckPBA, 24 PERB H3028 (1991). 
8See Mellon v. Benker, supra note 5. 
9Part 213 - Exceptions to the Board, §213(b)(1) through (4). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R, Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4983 
EAST QUOGUE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
' A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Pubiic Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
) 
I 
Certification - C-4983 page 2 
Included: All full-time and part-time custodial, grounds and maintenance 
employees. 
Excluded: The maintenance crew leader, assistant plant facilities manager, 
plant facilities manager and all other employees. 
XURTHERJT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
larc A. Abbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL #264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4991 
TOWN OF LEWISTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local #264, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All regular full-time and regular part-time Water Department 
employees. 
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Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local #264. The 
dutyJo negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
' ^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 200-D, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5006 
TOWN OF COLONIE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
y
 Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 200-D, SEIU, AFL-CIO, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5006 
Included: All full-time and part-time paramedics who have worked on average 
at least 24 hours per month over the past 6 months. 
Excluded: All other employees 
EURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Local 200-D, SEIU, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 7, 2000 
New York, New York 
^ . ^ ^ A / ^ ^ ^ 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Emergency Consensus Rule-Making 
WHEREAS, the Legislature has found and declared the necessity of enhancing 
protection against strikes and disruption of vital public services^by public safety employees 
throughout the state; and 
WHEREAS, the Legislature has further found that the orderly resolution of such 
disputes is necessary to enhance public safety and prevent the loss or inteTfuption of vital 
public services; and 
WHEREAS, based on the above findings and declarations, the Legislature has 
extended the impasse resolution procedures of section 209 of the Act to disputes in the 
course of collective negotiations between local governments and police and fire bargaining 
units, and 
WHEREAS, the Legislature has extended the impasse resolution procedures of 
section 209 of the Act to disputes between certified or recognized employee organizations 
and the public employer as to the conditions of employment of members of any organized 
unit of troopers, commissioned or noncommissioned officers of the division of state police 
or as to the conditions of employment of members of any organized unit of investigators, 
senior investigators and investigator specialists of the division of state police, and 
WHEREAS, because disputes in the course of collective negotiations between local 
governments and police and fire bargaining units, and between organized units of the 
division of state police and their public employer may arise at any time, the Rules of 
—2— 
Procedure of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board must be amended 
on an emergency basis to effect the Legislature's will, and 
WHEREAS, the emergency adoption of such amendments is necessary for the 
preservation of the public safety and welfare pursuant to State Administrative Procedure 
Act sections 202 (6) and 203, 
BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board hereby adopts, effective immediately, the following amendments to 4 NYCRR Part 
205 on an emergency basis pursuant to sections 202 (6) and 203 of the State 
Administrative Procedure Act, and Article 14, Sections 205 (5) and 209, of the Civil Service 
Law: 
1.4 NYCRR 205.3 is amended to read as follows: 
§205.3 Compulsory interest arbitration pursuant to section 209.4 of the act: 
scope. 
The following relates to impasses in collective negotiations between a public employer and 
,,[a] recognized or certified employee organizations covered by the provisions of section 
209.4 of the act [that represents officers or members of an organized fire department or 
an organized police force or police department of any county, city (except the City of New 
York, town, village, fire district or a police district and the employing county, city (except the 
City of New York), town, village, fire district or police district]. 
2. 4 NYCRR 205.5 (b) is amended as follows: 
(b) Contents. Such response shall contain respondent's position specifying the terms and 
conditions of employment that were resolved by agreement, and as to those that were not 
agreed upon, respondent shall set forth its position. Proposed contract language may be 
attached. If the respondent has filed an improper practice charge or declaratory ruling 
petition related to compulsory interest arbitration or other objections to arbitrability under 
section 205.6 of this Part, the response shall contain a reference to such charge^ [or] 
petitionT^orobjectionsTThe response must include proof of service upon thepetitioning 
party. 
3. 4 NYCRR 205.6(a) is amended to read as follows: 
(a) Objections to arbitrability. Objections to the arbitrability of any matter set forth in the 
petition or response may only be raised by the filing of an improper practice charge under 
Part 204 of this Chapter or a declaratory ruling under Part 210 of this Chapter pursuant to 
the requirements of this section, except, as to impasses in collective negotiations between 
the City of New York and recognized or certified employee organizations covered by the 
provisions of section 209.4 of the act, objections to the arbitrability of any matter set forth 
in the petition or response may only be raised as authorized by local charter, code, 
ordinance, or rule. As limited by the provisions of section 209.4(e) of the act. [Qjobjections 
as to arbitrability may include, but not be limited to, the following circumstances: 
(1) a matter proposed is not a mandatory subject of negotiations; 
(2) a matter proposed was not the subject of negotiations prior to the petition; 
(3) a matter proposed had been resolved by agreement during the course of negotiations. 
4. 4 NYCRR 205.6(d) is amended to read as follows: 
(d) The public arbitration panel shall not make any award on issues, the arbitrability of 
which is the subject of an improper practice charge or a declaratory ruling petition pursuant 
to the requirements of this section, until the final determination thereof by the board or 
withdrawal of such charge or petition, except, as to impasses in collective negotiations 
between the City of New York and recognized or certified employee organizations covered 
by the provisions of section 209.4 of the act, where objections to the arbitrability of any 
mattenare-raised asauthorizedby local -charter—code—ordinance—or-fuleHihe public 
arbitration panel shall not make any award on issues raised by such objections to 
arbitrability until the final determination of those objections by the agency, board, panel, 
or arbitrator having jurisdiction over those objections or withdrawal of such objections: the 
public arbitration panel may make an award on other issues. 
AND BE IT HEREBY FURTHER RESOLVED that Counsel is directed to take 
forthwith the necessary steps to give notice of and publish these emergency rules, and to 
give notice of these amendments as Consensus Rule-Making. 
DATED: AUGUST 7, 2000 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 
vX/t/tstsist. 
MICHAEL R. CUEVAS, CHAIRMAN 
// MARC A. ABBOTT, MEMBER 
JOHN T. MITCHELL, MEMBER 
EXPLANATION: Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets [ ] is old rule 
language to be omitted. 
